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ABSTRACT
Modern power systems worldwide are facing a rising appeal for the upgrade
to a highly intelligent generation of electricity networks commonly known as the
Smart Grid. Advanced monitoring and control systems like Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) sys-
tems have been widely deployed and management based on them provides more
flexible and achievable optimal control of power generation, transmission and dis-
tribution. However, the growing integration of power system with communication
networks also brings increasing challenges to the security of the modern power grid,
from both cyber and physical space. Malicious attackers can take advantage of the
increased access to the monitoring and control of the system and exploit some of
the inherent structural vulnerability of power grids. Motivated by these security
challenges, the goal of this thesis is to facilitate the understanding of power grid
outages and blackouts triggered by these attacks, to analyze the cascading process
that leads to the impactful events, and to support the decision making in defense
and protection for a reliable and secure Smart Grid around the corner. Simulation
results from real-world power system benchmarks have been analytically discussed
from both the spatial and temporal perspectives and important decision-support
information have been revealed through several chapters of the thesis. This re-
search is part of an ongoing National Science Foundation (NSF) funded Smart
Grid security project led by Dr. Haibo He, Dr. Yan (Lindsay) Sun from the Elec-
trical Engineering Department and Dr. Peter August from the Natural Resources
Science Department, all at the University of Rhode Island.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 The Smart Grid and Its Security Challenges
Since its birth over a century ago, the power system in the United States has
been evolved into one of the largest complex networks ever witnessed in human
history. With the increasing consumption demand, the modern electrical power
grids are now growing into a mammoth system with numerous interconnected
regional grids, owned and operated by power corporations at all levels and scales.
However, complex interests, operations and managements among different power
companies often complicate cross-region transmission tasks and sometimes result
in an inefficient or poorly-coordinated power delivery. And the traditional power
grids in modern times are facing some rising challenges. As the need and variety of
consumption increases, more and more latest technologies have been incorporated
into the power system, such as the distributed renewable energy generation, the
electric vehicle (EV) charging system, smart meters, etc., which all contribute to
the complexity of modern power delivery. The ever increasing reliance on electricity
and request of power quality have been constantly calling for better power delivery,
more flexible pricing, faster power restoration, among others.
The challenges above have motivated the industry and society for a new gen-
eration of power system with more informative, intelligent and automatic opera-
tions [1]. This new generation of power grid, commonly referred to as the Smart
Grid, will modernize the traditional power grid and improve its reliability, flexibil-
ity and efficiency. The Smart Grid is expected to have more distributed controls
and consumer-based interactions, and some key applications of this upgrade in-
cludes:
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1. Installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and other intelligent de-
vices to reduce extra unnecessary demand, as well as the operation and main-
tenance cost [2, 3];
2. Implementing distributed automation to enhance the reliability of power sys-
tem [4];
3. Utilizing automated controls for better and flexible power management [5].
The most significant feature of the Smart Grid, in contrast to the traditional
power system, is the large scale of implementation of a two-way communication
network connecting both the power plants, the transmission network sensors and
the consumers. This enhanced and interactive system will optimize the power
delivery quality, efficiency and stability at a lower cost via the computer-based
automation. With the incorporation of communication and computer networks in
assistance to the traditional power delivery, the Smart Grid is already an emerg-
ing gigantic intelligent network system in which power flows are flexibly directed
by highly automatic systems like the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system.
However, the Smart Grid yields not only a boost of economic benefits but
also a growing number of potential threats from the cyberspace [6]. While the dis-
tributed control can reduce the criticality of some control center and thus weaken
the impact of attacks targeted on them, the distributed access from the system-on-
a-chip (SoC) electrical devices can possibly allow malicious attackers penetrating
into the power systems with increased difficulties to detect and track them. Mean-
while, with the huge volume of data flowing along the power transmission network,
they are becoming more vulnerable to data or command interception and unautho-
rized modification, which can be utilized to either cheat the meters for an unfair
price or disrupt power system operations. More seriously, knowledge of the power
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grid can be learned and the information or intelligence could be used to hack into
the distributed control units that may be less protected than the centralized op-
eration and management hubs, resulting in unpredictable security risks. Hence, it
becomes crucial to realize and react to the vulnerability of Smart Grid in the new
forms of potential attacks. These “smart” attacks, if deliberately designed and
launched successfully on some critical components, can cast a disastrous impact
on the power grid transmission and significantly jeopardize the interest of both the
public, the industry as well as the economics.
One of the vulnerabilities of Smart Grid that could be taken advantage of by
the attackers are the possibility of cascading failure events in power systems, in
which a few failed components can trigger the collapse of normal power transmis-
sion and consequently results in blackouts in the distribution networks on the users’
side. There are many examples of power grid failures with severe consequences; i.e.
the 2003 blackout in northeast U.S., the 2011 blackout in California, Arizona and
Mexico, and the most recent 2012 massive blackout in India have all left millions
of people in darkness. They have shown that major power blackouts caused by
cascading failure, though rare as they are, cast significant impact to both society
and industry [7, 8]. Therefore, the government, the engineering community and
power industry are paying growing attention to the power grid cascading analysis
and many significant results have been published [9–12].
However, while a number of power grid stability and security issues have been
resolved, it is noticed that the complexity of smart grid security has nevertheless
been diluted, and the understanding of it is still far from comprehensive [13, 14].
For instance, how the cascading effect triggered by different failures propagates in
different systems is not yet predictable or precisely approximated by any model
[9] [12]. More questions, for instance how attackers, aiming at maximizing impact
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to the grid at the lowest cost by just taking down only a few components, could
utilize the structural vulnerability and the potential access to key components in
the grid, and how the smart grid and its operators should respond correspondingly
to these attacks, still remain unclear to both the industry as well as the research
community. Therefore, the complexity of cascading failure and the computational
cost to simulate these events still call for more effective and efficient modeling,
simulating and analyzing tools. They will be critical to provide a comprehensive
and robust assessment for decision support and defense strategy improvement to
protect the Smart Grid against the smart attacks [15] [16].
Given these considerations, the goal in the study of this thesis is to shed some
light on the problem of how to secure the Smart Grid against major blackouts
caused by intelligent attacks. Specifically, in this work the focus will be first
to reveal what are the impacts of potential attacks, how to identify the critical
components, and what are the system failure behavior in the attack scenarios.
Based on the work and preliminary results, more works on how to respond to
these failures via proper counter-measurements (either manual or automatic) can
be conducted to enhance the security of the future Smart Grid.
1.2 The General Methodology
As the last part of the introduction, the general methodology employed to
study the problem of Smart Grid Security will be discussed in detail to provide
the readers a clear and general idea of the work included in this thesis.
1.2.1 The Focus of the Study
In this thesis, three major objectives for the research have been specified:
1. Understanding cascading process: Intuitively, we are interested in revealing
how the cascading failures propagate across the region, and how it develop
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over time.
2. Identifying most vulnerable components: For this purpose, we want to prop-
erly measure the impact of the failure of victim under attack, and then
effectively and efficiently locate the most vulnerable components that will
cause the greatest impact if they are attacked;
3. Discussing corresponding defenses responses: This will become the practi-
cal meaning of the work to provide spatial and temporal information and
knowledge for the defenders to respond to potential attacks.
In the study of cascading failure, simulations and analysis will be the key
methodology, since it will be very difficult and expensive to set up a test in real
power system. This is also the major approach through which the malicious attack-
ers can build up an informative attack based on the power grid status. Particularly,
in this study three objectives of simulation can be defined to analyze the power
system behavior in a cascading even:
1. Electrical measurements: This is the most traditional and well-developed
indicators of power system which evaluate the load shedding/yield, the num-
ber of outage lines and substations, or the population under blackout, among
others. These are all the technical indices directly assessing the power system
stability and security from the operation and engineering point of view.
2. Spatial patterns: As cascading failures often yield a large scale regional im-
pact, their geographic information can not only exhibit some spatial patterns
but also reveal the potential cost of mitigation and restoration. With the
help of GIS systems, the spatial information can be displayed more intu-
itively through a properly designed visual platform. Hence, with the help
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of the author’s colleagues working in the same project, it is helpful to em-
ploy a GIS demo and then analyze the spatial pattern and characteristics of
cascading failures in a power system.
3. Temporal features: While time-domain dynamic/transient stability analysis
has been popular in the power and energy society for many years, it is not
yet a well-developed area in the power system cascading analysis. Although
it is helpful to evaluate consecutive cascading events that finally lead to a
regional blackout, to track the causal relationship between them and to record
all the events and factors that have possibly affected the cascading failure
process, the complexity is usually intimidating. However, using some proper
assumptions and simplifications, a well-designed model with proper indices
can reveal critical features in the cascading process and provide information
for a better timing decision to respond to the failure, which is especially
useful when in reality only restricted resource and limited time are given.
1.2.2 The Basic Assumptions
Due to the inherit complexity of the dynamics and failure behaviors of power
system, to set up a valid model of power grid attacks, it will be necessary to in-
troduce a few essential assumptions and limit the scope of problem to investigate
within a certain range. The major assumptions involve the topological representa-
tion of the power system. With resourceful researches from the computer science
and communication society on the topological vulnerability of complex networks
under attacks (e.g. [17] and [18]), the investigation of smart grid security will start
from available topological methods and models with necessary modifications.
Specifically, this means the research in the thesis will first take the assumption
that the smart grid can be modeled as a complex network, to which current topo-
logical vulnerability metrics from complex network studies can be applied. Power
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flow models are also widely used in traditional power grid stability and contingency
analysis. However, it is known that an accurate replication of a large scale power
grid with thousands of components and detailed operation status and control man-
agement is indeed prohibitive and unnecessary. In this proposed project, the goal
model will try to avoid and simplify some complex realtime dynamics like three-
phase ac voltage, disturbance of power quality and consumer-side distribution.
1.2.3 The Benchmark Power System
The subject, as the focus of proposed research, will be the power transmission
network. It is a cluster of power delivery networks that are usually regarded as
a single interconnected or regional grid, which transmits power from a number of
generation power plants to numerous distribution substations via a set of facilities
like transformers and relays. The transmission involves two major types of power
grid component, i.e. the substations and transmission lines. An illustration of a
metropolitan power grid around the Bay area is shown in Fig.1, where substations
are marked in green and transmission lines in blue. The data are extracted from the
POWERmap GIS dataset provided by PLATTS, a McGill company. From the fig-
ure we can intuitively see that our refined focus considers less types of components
than a complete monumental power grid that will also include generation networks
and distribution networks alike. Therefore, it better matches the assumption of
smart grid as an interconnected complex networks and serves the purpose of both
effective and efficient modeling of power transmission networks. Meanwhile, it still
holds substantial importance in the study of smart grid security from two aspects:
First, the transmission networks are more vulnerable to cyber-attacks than power
plants and control centers guarded and protected in the assess-restricted genera-
tion networks. Second, their failures (causing most blackouts) contribute to more
significant impact and damage to the society and industry than the distribution
7
Figure 1. The power grid of the upper Bay area, displayed in ArcMap 10.0.
networks, whose failures (usually referred to as disturbances) are mostly local and
constrained to only a small area.
1.2.4 The Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, a literature survey
of the state-of-the-art in Smart Grid security studies will be presented. A detailed
model used for the simulation in this work will be described in Chapter 3. In
Chapter 4 to 5, implementation details , simulations and discussions will be first
provided from the attacker’s point of view, each followed with some discussions
from the defender’s perspective. Specifically, chapter 4 will explore the spatial
patterns of cascading failures, while Chapter 5 will reveal temporal features of the
post-attack system failure events identified from our simulations. The conclusion
and future work are with Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
This chapter will briefly review some of the up-to-date researches related to
Smart Grid security issues in multiple fields. As the following discussion indicates,
while a significant amount of work has been done and numerous issues satisfactorily
resolved, there are still many emerging challenges in the applications of Smart Grid
that slow down the effort of its installation and replacement of traditional power
grids. The first section of this chapter will introduce the reliability and stability
analysis from the perspective of power system operation, which lies the theoretical
foundation for vulnerability assessment and security analysis. The second section
will introduce the modern network security approaches that deal with the specific
applications in the application of Smart Grid.
2.1 Smart Grid Reliability/Stability Analysis
Reliability or stability analysis of Smart Grid is the extension of traditional
power system analysis for the emerging new generation. In general, a Smart Grid
can be represented though a set of conceptual models [19]. From the intuitive
and interactive illustrations shown in [19], it is inevitable that the introduction of
renewable resources, storage and intelligent demand response will bring unforeseen
patterns and variances in the power generation, transmission and distribution [20].
For example, the output of generation power from wind farms as well as the fast-
changing demand of electrical vehicle charging are highly unpredictable and un-
controllable, both of which pose great challenges to the traditional power grid that
runs on a strictly constrained operating point of voltage, phase, frequency and
power level. Similar upgrades in Smart Grid require the conversion of traditional
power system stability analysis into the modern approaches, especially with the
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utilization of powerful tools from the developments of intelligent algorithms and
computing resources. Specifically, in this section four aspects, i.e. state estimation,
contingency analysis, transient stability analysis, and cascading failure analysis for
the reliability and stability of Smart Grid will be discussed.
2.1.1 State Estimation
State estimation (SE) is a classic approach to generate proper control policy for
various system states [21]. It is derived on classic control theory and combined with
the power system characteristics to determine the actual system state that cannot
be directly observed from a collection of redundant measurements. This is critical
in power grids as the operators relies greatly on the precise information of system
states, to properly adjust the operation points and maintain the stable delivery of
electricity to various power consumers. As the upgrade of transmission capacity
usually falls behind the increase of generation and demand, and the measurements
are always mixed with certain amount of noise, the system operators and managers
need to accurately estimate the true power system states and carefully balance
between the operation constraints and the cost. As a result, intense research
efforts have been focused in the field of state estimation to ensure the stability of
power systems and industrial large scale state estimation system have been widely
applied in the power grid control centers [22, 23].
In Smart Grid, the state estimation faces a lot of challenges from both ef-
ficiency and security perspective. With the increased complexity in the modern
Smart Grid, which is embedded with a vast online sensor network generating a
gigantic flow of data, together with increased number of states that can yield
even more irregular variances, the system state estimator needs to be efficient and
accurate as much as possible. Moreover, as the data collected from the now less-
protected sensors could be hijacked or forged, the study of state estimation also
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needs to come up with modern detection approaches that can effectively handle
the false data injected to the estimator so that accurate control policy for the oper-
ation of power systems can be provided. Numerous works on the state estimation
application in Smart Grid have been published to handle the reliability issues for
state estimation [24–26]. However, as the part in a system operator mostly related
to the communication networks in Smart Grid, state estimation is still exposed to
most cyber security threats than other aspects.
2.1.2 Contingency Analysis
Contingency analysis (CA) is a traditional static approach that simulates the
outage for a given set of power grid components or elements under a given model
and evaluates the consequent events following the outage [27–29]. CA methods
usually assesses the redundancy and robustness of power grids in the outages of
some of the components, and concludes if a grid is N−k secure if it is able to remain
within an operation domain when k components are put in an outage situation. In
most cases a power system is only guaranteed to be N−1 secure due to the cost of
maintaining a large redundancy above its operation points and the computational
complexity in evaluating multi-contingency events for a large power system.
However, due to the reports of large scale blackouts and the growing threats
from cyberspace that malignant attackers are obtaining more computing resource
to knock down multiple components at the same time, recent works in the field
of CA focus on the development of fast, adaptive search algorithm to efficiently
eliminate sets of guaranteed N −k secured contingencies and refine the candidates
to a decent level. Many have works have applied artificial neural networks [30] or
radial basis function network [31] for contingency analysis. Others have focused
on efficient monitoring and detection methods [32,33] for CA purpose.
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2.1.3 Dynamic/Transient Stability Analysis
Dynamic stability analysis (DSA), or transient stability analysis (TSA) [34]
deals with the synchronization of generators relating to the electromagnetic behav-
iors. This analysis focus on the control of specific power system state, or operating
points, including rotor angle, active and reactive power flow, generator voltage, in
the presence of a given disturbance (e.g. a single or three-phase one-end grounded
fault) [27]. Using optimization and control theories, DSA/TSA solves coupled
differential equations of detailed system state measurements and observes each
transient power system state in the time domain. The observed states can be di-
rectly used to evaluate the ability of each power generator to remain operationally
stable against the given fault or disturbance, and different control regulators or
policies can be applied to stabilize the system at an equilibrium point while trying
meet the load demand in a grid with the given fault.
DSA/TSA methods are usually validated on a small power system bench-
marks, yet the complexity in time-domain simulation (simulating power system
behavior for a few seconds with a step length of 1ms or less) leads to studies
on the computing methods for stability analysis [35–38]. Some researches focus
on secure and robust TSA algorithms [39, 40]; meanwhile, many adaptive control
policies based on machine learning algorithms [41] like Artificial Neural Network
(ANN) [42], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [43,44], Heuristic Dynamic Program-
ming(HDP) [45] or Particle Swarm Optimization [46] have been proposed to adap-
tively control the power system states. In addition, modern DSA/TSA often em-
ploy benchmarks like doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) for wind farms or
static synchronous compensator (STATCOM) for voltage stability, reflecting the
latest trend of the installation of renewable energy in the Smart Grid. Although
the computational cost of DSA/TSA on a large scale system remains prohibitive,
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related analysis on a small benchmark can usually provide good indication and
validation for large power transmission networks in real world.
2.1.4 Cascading Failure Analysis
As mentioned previously, cascading failure is the main reason that some small
system faults resulting in major blackouts. As reported in [7], in August 2003, a
defect operator failed to perform a critical redistribution of power for an overloaded
transmission line, resulting in the major blackout that affected more than 55 million
people in the Northeast American region. Similarly, in the recent India blackout
in 2012, with the power system approaching its peak limit during the extreme heat
in the summer, a tripped transmission line left more than 300 million people in
a blackout on July 30, while on the following day a failed relay in the partially
restored system made over 600 million people out of power in another blackout [8].
In both events, all industry, public transportation, health service and consumer use
were interrupted, and many of the affected population, without individual backup
generators of their own, struggled in the blackout chaos.
In many cascading failures, the automatic protective relays deployed across
the power transmission network is the most common reason that turns an single or
small scale outage into a blackout. When they cut off failure-affected components
to maintain the stability of power system, some failed or improper attempts will
result in more subsequent disconnections of power grid components, triggering an
avalanche effect across the whole network.
Due to the highly interconnected nature of power grid, when a victim in
the grid is take down, the influence of its failure is not likely to be constrained
within the initial victims. It could possibly propagate along the grid and cause
an overloading issue across the network [9–11]. For a well-designed system with
proper control policy or an less-effective attack, the failure can be tolerated to some
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extent, causing only some disturbances in power transfer quality without further
propagation [47]. However, if the attacker has a good understanding of the power
grid and initiates the attack from more vulnerable components in the power grid,
the failure of these victims may lead to some fatal overloading and cause cascading
in a large area.
Many systematic models for cascading analysis have been developed in great
depth [9–11] to address these challenges in analyzing the power grid cascading fail-
ure. Among them, ac power flow model has its strength in accuracy as it carries
the reactive power in calculation, which better approximate power grid in reality
at the cost of greater computational complexity [12] [9]. Dc power flow models are
very popular with a tradeoff between the precision of power grids approximation
and the computational cost of simulation [48], but they require detailed physical
parameters of the power grid that are hard to obtain in reality. High-level statis-
tic approaches use historic data to analyze the power grid failure from a general
perspective [49] [50]. Topological models are also frequently used in the security
analysis of power system as they provide powerful tools from complex system and
computer science fields [51] [52] and work with most GIS databases of electric util-
ities in industry. In addition to the modelling work [53], there are also studies on
system dynamics and operation points, evaluating the self-organized criticality in
power system cascading failures, which also plays an important role in cascading
analysis [15, 16, 54]. Finally, some researches also works on large scale power sys-
tems, like the Western Electricity Coordinating Council [55] [56] or Polish Grid in
winter [12], and the mathematical software [57] to solve power system dynamics
effectively and efficiently.
Unfortunately, the cascading effect of power system is not well understood
and many of the works did not provide comprehensive models [9] to represent
14
how the failure propagates through the grid, or how to constrain the cascading
effect at some critical moments before it leads to a blackout. Therefore in this
thesis, we are mostly interested in evaluating these fatal cascading failures caused
by malicious cyber-attacks, where the victims are selected based on both the at-
tackers’ knowledge of the power grid topology and the predicted behavior of failure
cascading.
2.2 Smart Grid Security Analysis
While the blooming Smart Grid technologies, the security issues are also be-
coming more challenging with the mass computer based monitoring, control and
metering, and numerous researches have proposed their general frameworks or plat-
forms from their perspective for the comprehensive understanding of smart grid
security [58–61]. In these section, we will discuss the general security issues and
the major types of Smart Grid attacks, with some powerful tools developed to
assess and address these issues.
2.2.1 Smart Grid Security Issues
Smart Grid, as an integration of power transmission networks and communi-
cation networks, can be vulnerable in both physical and cyber space [13, 14, 62].
These include challenges in accurate measurement and monitoring of power system
states, power transmission reliability against disruptive events, control of access
and authentication, detection and defence against malicious attacks, as well as
the protection of user privacy [63]. Coordinated attacks can take place in both
networks and it can be difficult to identify these attacks and distinguish them
from usual disturbances, especially when millions of users data are also recorded
by smart meters all across the country, while there are only a few control centers
to ensure the stability of the whole interconnected systems. In this thesis, we are
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specifically interested in the attacks on power system directly, which usually bring
the most catastrophic effects if proper counter-measures are not called in time.
However, in reality attacks on different levels can be launched simultaneously, so
we will first briefly explore the major types of Smart Grid attacks to better explain
the related fields for this study.
2.2.2 Categories of Smart Grid Attacks
Generally, to refine the scope of the thesis we can roughly divide attacks in the
Smart Grid into three categories based on the definition in [13, 14], which are the
consumer-end attacks, the data attacks, and the direct attacks, and the subject
of this study will be the last type that can lead to the most severe impact to the
power system.
Consumer-end Attacks
The consumer-end attacks are the attacks happening at the consumer end
[63–65], e.g. smart meters or distribution network controllers. Many of these at-
tacks are the personal attempts to treat the meters with some software or Trojan
scripts for unfair electricity price, or to steal user consumption profile for private
information. Although they do not carry the purpose to jeopardize power system
stability or security which appears less fatal or impactful, consumer-end attacks is
not trivial as the user-end devices have feedback access all the way up to control
centers. If attackers aim at creating social chaos, they can still try to forge sus-
picious or erroneous requests and send them to the control center, resulting in a
denial of power delivery service for the “corrupted user demand”. This denial may
either shut down the switch of normal residential buildings or interrupt the quality
of power delivered to critical social infrastructures like hospitals, transportation.
In other cases, user data can also be stolen from the smart meters, giving off private
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information that can pose other threats to individual users.
To address issues raised by this type of attack, researchers have been focused
on the development of a secure interaction between the smart meter and the users
[66–68]. These include better encryption [66] and authentication [69,70], as well as
advanced meter reading and communication techniques [67]. In addition, privacy
issues have also been studied from both hardware and software aspects [68,71,72].
Data Attacks
By its name, data attacks are the type of Smart Grid attacks targeting at the
data flow that are transmitted along the communication network [13, 73]. Many
researches suggest that the data attacks are mostly related to the state estimation
of power systems [14, 74]. Attacks of this type include insertion, alteration, or
deletion of data or control commands [75–77]. The application of these attacks
can overlap with the consumer-end attacks in the deception of metering devices,
but usually in data attacks they are targeted at power system instead of a single
user-end device and organized in a more specialized way.
As some studies have revealed, the detection on the false data injection [78]
or load alteration attacks [79] can be very difficult if the attackers have sufficient
knowledge about the topological information of the power grids. In these worst
cases, the attackers do not have to know about the operating point or the exact
states of the system, yet they can nevertheless forge fake data without showing
anomaly and successfully walk around the traditional detection methods. Because
of the data protection can be extremely hard due to the vast amount of data
collected and generated through a gigantic network, there are still many ongoing
researches to optimize the chance of detection and lower the risk of disastrous
consequences from data attacks.
17
Direct Attacks
The most severe attacks in the power grids is the cyber-physical ones directly
aimed at the disruption of critical power transmission network components like
power plants, substations or transmission lines [80–82]. By creating outage and
tripping of these components which were in normal operation, the attackers can
turn an interconnected power system into an instable state, which usually ends up
in massive blackouts as a consequence of cascading failures mentioned Sect. 2.1.4
in this chapter.
In reality, direct attacks can be done by via data attacks, for instance forging
fake messages of system state, outage, instability or tripping and sending them
to the control centers, resulting in mistaken actions and regulations that causes
cascading effects. These attacks can also be coordinated in a cyber-physical space
by tools like Petri-nets [83], which will significantly increase their chance of success
and the severity of the attack. Studies have shown that by exploiting the vulner-
ability of power systems, direct attacks can be studied as contingencies of outage
since they have similar effects, yet the consequence of these malicious attacks can
be much more catastrophic with the well-chosen victims selected by the intelligence
information [55,84].
2.2.3 Smart Grid Security Tools
To address thee security issues, many traditional approaches from the net-
work security studies, including intelligent and efficient trust control, advanced
encryption, bad data detection, etc. have been introduced. In addition, to better
approximate and understand the interaction between attackers and defenders in
securing the Smart Grid, theorems and techniques from game theory, petri-net,
clustering/partitioning, data mining have been introduced. Researches based on
game theory can effective display the optimal choice for both attackers and defend-
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ers based on their own cost in the scenarios [85,86]. Petri-nets are very powerful in
identifying and handling multiple events happened cyber-physically [83,87]. Clus-
tering and partitioning techniques reveal critical and effective measures to refine
the influence of attacks with a small area so that the protection and restoration will
cost significantly less [61,88,89]. Data mining algorithms can take great advantage
of the growing volume of data collected throughout the Smart Grid network sensors
and extract important information on the healthiness and anomaly of the opera-
tion power grids [90]. Still, many of these tools are facing difficulties in application
due to their scalability, computational efficiency or real-time capabilities [91].
2.3 Summary of the Literature Review
In this chapter we briefly introduced the emerging reliability and security is-
sues and related researches in Smart Grid. It should be noticed that many of the
researches in reliability and security analysis overlap with each other. In many
cases it is impossible to investigate security issues without evaluating the stability
and reliability of power systems, while it is also crucial to evaluate the cyber-
physical safety and protection of power systems when they are greatly integrated
with online communication networks. As a result, this thesis will set aside the
differences of reliability and security studies while focus on the specific vulnerabil-
ity assessment of direct attacks in Smart Grid that challenges its reliability and
security.
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CHAPTER 3
Power Grid Modelling
In this chapter, we will describe the model of power grid and cascading failure
adopted in this study, which provides the simulation model for the purpose of
cascading failure analysis.
3.1 Topological Model
As mentioned previously in Chapter 2, among the power system models avail-
able for cascading analysis, in this work the topology-based model will be chosen
to provide the preliminary result and insight for further investigation. Most of the
topological information on the structure of a power grid can be obtained in the form
of geospatial dataset. It has been standardized thanks to the effort of power and
energy industry, geographic information system (GIS) industry, as well as govern-
ment supported academic institutes like the Power Systems Engineering Research
Center (PSERC) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
In contrast to the wide area dynamic operational states and parameters stored and
protected in the control centers, these topological data are more accessible from
commercial companies or academic institutes. They provide the time-invariant
information that does not subject to the transient state of power systems, which
makes it a useful source of knowledge in the vulnerability assessment of power
grids.
In order to represent the power grid as a topological network, there are a few
assumptions to be specified:
First, as part of a transmission network, a substation in our power grid cas-
cading model is referred to as a node, regardless of its type as a generator, a load
or simply a pass-through transmission substation; also, a transmission line which
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connects one substation at each end will be regarded as a branch in the network.
Hence the power grid is regarded as a bidirectional unweighted graph [51,52,92,93],
a simplification that helps to reduce the computational cost significantly.
Second, we will define the load, on which the process of failure cascading relies
heavily. From studies of high-level power grid structure [9, 15, 52, 54], it is shown
that the load of a given node is highly related to the connectivity or centrality
of its neighbors. It means that a node, either connecting to more neighbors or
whose direct neighbors have greater connectivity, will be more likely to take greater
portion of load in the power delivery. Therefore, in this work we define the load
of a node as the product of its degree and the summation of the degree of all its
neighbors, as in [92,94]. Let Deg(v) be the degree of a given node v and Nbr(v) the
set of neighboring nodes of v, respectively, then the load for each node v, denoted
as L(v), is calculated as follows:
L(v) = Deg(v)
∑
Deg(n), n ∈ Nbr(v) (1)
Thirdly, we will describe the redistribution policy in the topological model.
When a victim node (say Node v) is attacked by intruders or cut off by cascading
failure, its load will be proportionally redistributed to its neighbors u ∈ Nbr(v)
and the load of each active neighbor n of the victim will be updated according to
Equation (2):
∆L(n) =
L(n)∑
u∈Nbr(v)
L(u)
L(v) (2)
A numeric example for Equation (2) can be shown: supposing two neighboring
nodes A and B both carry a load of 100, and the total load of all of Node A’s
neighbors is 1000, then when Node A first fails during the cascading failure, Node
B will carry an extra load of 10 since its original load contributes to 10% of the
total neighboring load of Node A. Another illustrative and intuitive example is
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Figure 2. Illustration of the load redistribution policy
shown in Fig.2, where the total load of all neighbors of victim node O is 100. The
numbers next to each node in black is the original load, and the numbers in red is
the extra load that will be added on each node if the hub node O is failed either
by direct attacks or by the effects of cascading process. The redistribution policy
is displayed clearly in this scenario.
Once a node fails, it will be disconnected from the power grid, which means
it will be removed from the neighborhood sets of all nodes in current power grid
topology, and any branches connecting to this failed node will be tripped as no more
power could be delivered through it. Note that an isolated node is also regarded
as failed since all branches connecting to it have been tripped. If no failure occurs
after a certain amount of time, the power grid is considered as stabilized, which
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marks the end of a cascading failure.
The redistribution can cause overloading on some of surviving neighbors of
victim v in the grid and can lead to subsequent cascading failures. So, considering
a non-recoverable scenario, when a node is overloaded to a certain degree, it will be
regarded as fatally overloaded and cut off from the network with all the branches
that directly linked to it. The threshold of overloading ratio, above which a node
is considered failed, is then referred to as the system tolerance, and currently
we assign a universal system tolerance, denoted as T , for all the nodes in the
network. The failure propagation will continue as long as new fatally overloaded
nodes emerge in the grid, leading to a cascading failure across the network. If
the initial victims are well-selected, the malicious attacker will be able to create a
remarkable blackout in its scale or speed of propagation in the power system. Note
that there is no ground-truth for the practical value of T , and so in the simulation
different values of T will be tested for this important factor, which will also affect
the cascading process significantly.
Finally, when a number of nodes are failed, we use the concept of “round”
to help describing the progress of failure cascading. The definition of a round is
illustrated in Fig.3. The very first set of failed nodes consists of the victims in
the initial attack. Then the nodes knocked down by the cascading failure of initial
victims will be regarded as the victims of second round, so on and so forth. In
this way, failed nodes at different rounds of a cascading process form a tree-like
structure where the “child” nodes are the direct victims of their parent node’s
failure, and the root nodes are the initial multi-victims set of attacks. In this
structure a node may have more than one parent if it is affected by multiple
nodes failure at the same time, which represents the overlapping of multi-victim
cascading, as shown in Fig.3.
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Figure 3. Illustration of “rounds” as a cascading tree.
As the failure propagates through the surviving networked nodes, the load of
the remaining system will be shed due to the impaired transmission capacity. At
a certain moment, the load will be likely to drop to an extent low enough that the
load carried by each branch will all stay below the fatal overloading threshold and
thus the cascading process will come to a final stabilized state. The simulator will
then stop the simulation and return all the data recorded during the cascading
process for further analysis.
One more fact to notice is that the load and status of each node is only
updated once at each round, which means the nodes failed in the same round will
not have instant effect on others. Instead, the failure of all nodes of last round will
simultaneously affect the remaining active nodes in next round. In this sense, our
cascading model better matches a simultaneous failure process.
In spite of the assumptions and simplifications above, this topological model
still is important for cascading analysis in the following aspects:
1. First, it works extremely efficient in simulating the cascading process with
less computation overhead compared to power flow models. As an example,
the topology-based simulation for Bay area with about 500 nodes cost similar
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amount of time as a DC power flow model for IEEE 39 bus system with 39
nodes only;
2. In addition, in searching a set of multiple victims in a simultaneous attack
scheme, topology based models usually provide more information and less
computation overhead in refining the set of candidate victims;
3. Last but not least, it yields satisfactory approximation precision and the
topographic information is not subject to dynamic variance, providing good
evaluation accuracy in the structural vulnerability of power grids.
In summary, the overall cascading failure simulator can be generalized in fol-
lowing steps:
1. Trigger a multi-node cascading failure by knock down some victims in the
grid;
2. Calculate the load redistribution and mark fatally overloaded nodes as failed;
3. Disconnect failed nodes and branches from the grid;
4. Repeat step 2 and 3 until the process reaches a final stabilized state.
3.2 Assessment Metric
As we want to identify the most critical power grid components from the
failure cascading perspective, we use the final percentage/fraction of failure in the
power grid with respect to system tolerance T , denoted as PoF , as the assessment
metric:
PoF =
Nf
N
(3)
where Nf is the number of failed components and N the total number of compo-
nents in a given grid. For each attack simulated, we measured the value of PoF
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after the cascading failure stops at the final stabilized state. The physical meaning
of PoF e is related to the size of blackout as well as the cost of restoration, as each
component brought down during the cascading failure process requires some time,
ranging from hours to days, before the power transmission can be fully recovered.
According the previous definition of “round”, a cascading “tree” with more
“leaves”, i.e. PoF at the final round, indicates that the initial victims have re-
sulted in a larger blackout with more component failed consequently after the
initial attack; while with less rounds it indicates a faster failure propagation with
fewer intermediate process and requires a quicker decision to limit its impact at
an early stage. In addition, the more “child” nodes a parent node has, the more
critical it will be. By using this measurement, we are able to intuitively illustrate
the effectiveness of the proposed approach using the simulation model described
above and highlight the critical components in the power grid in any direct attack
scenarios.
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CHAPTER 4
Visualizing Cascading Failure for Spatial Pattern Analysis
As discussion in Chapter 1 and 2, for this chapter we will first focus on the
spatial patterns of cascading failures in power system. To illustrate the cascading
process in the space, a demo in ArcGIS is first developed with my colleague and
then the spatial patterns are visualized through examples companied by discus-
sions.
4.1 Spatial Analysis for Cascading Failure in Power Grids
In most researches, the information on the power systems are usually rep-
resented with the digitalized measurement, for instance generator voltage, load,
phase angle, active and reactive power, among others. They are recorded as nu-
merical values and tables, which is convenient for quantitative studies. Although
many of them are accompanied by some visualization tools, it is noted that most
of them did not take it as a formal form of security analysis. In many cases, the
power transmission network is only represented as an abstract grid which only
emphasizes the information on the substation type (generation, transmission and
distribution) and the existing transmission lines connecting them. Their exact
locations and lengths are usually not considered since acquiring and maintaining
such information with their detailed status are either difficult (with remote loca-
tions) or expensive (to install meters and keep track of the huge amount of data
generated) [29].
However, with the development of geographic information system (GIS), more
and more up-to-date power grid data become available with improved accuracy.
As a result, a growing number of GIS based analyses that have become popular
among the study of smart grid security [29,55,95].
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The GIS information of power grids can also be a potential intelligence re-
source for the attackers. These data are usually more accessible than the internal
data guarded within the power control centers; yet they provide some informative
details like the power grid topology and connectivity, the voltage categories, the
power plants and their ownership, the length of transmission lines that could be
used to approximate the admittance and resistance to solve power flows and sim-
ulate effectiveness of potential attacks. Therefore, we are interested in visualizing
the power grids in the space and assessing their structural vulnerability through
the spatial patterns.
Specifically, in this chapter the geospatial location and connectivity of power
grid substations will be visualized for cascading analysis. The implementation of
the GIS platform will be elaborated, and interesting yet important spatial informa-
tion on power system cascading failure behavior will be illustrated and discussed,
which has been part of the work published in [96].
4.2 Visualize the Cascading Attack
4.2.1 The Cascading Simulator
In this research, the single-victim attack algorithm proposed in [92] and in-
troduced in Chapter 3 of this thesis is adopted as the simulation model to acquire
the simulation results of cascading failure of substations and transmission lines.
MATLAB is chosen as the simulation platform and the simulator will record both
the stabilized grid after cascading as well as every intermediate process during the
failure propagation. The failure sequence of nodes (in forms of substation IDs)
will be forwarded to a MATLAB interface, which searches the victim nodes and
branches in GIS database and updates the database with a new attribute as an
identifier. A VBA script will be run in ArcGIS to keep track of the database and
visualize the status of one interested group of objects in the ArcGIS map in the
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Figure 4. Diagram of the compact ArcGIS-MATLAB visualization platform
form of layers, which could be overlapped to provide customized visualization for
analysis. In our platform, we deploy 2 layers to represent the transmission net-
work of a Smart Grid: substations and transmission lines. The flowchart of our
platform is demonstrated in Fig.4. Note that the GIS databases are stored in the
“shapefile” format in our experiments.
In the cascading model, as described in Chapter 4, we assume that when a
node (substation) is down, its load is redistributed to its neighbors. Also, we
assume that there is only one transmission line (branch) between two nodes, and
multiple branches between two nodes will be treated as one.
Under these assumptions, we start the attack by picking a single victim node
in the power grid. Once a node is knocked down, all the branches connected to it
will also be considered as failed at the same time. Using a constant tolerance for the
grid, the algorithm recalculates the load distribution iteratively and a cascading
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procedure will be generated throughout the grid until the grid reaches a final
stabilized status. A cascading failure is assessed by the fraction of failed nodes,
denoted by PoF at each round. Here one ’round’, as described previously in
Chapter 4, is defined as a period of time in which a number of nodes are knocked
down simultaneously by the cascading failure. In other words, in every new round
a set of new victim nodes emerges. Victims in each round could be updated to the
visualization interface, which is called an online model; or their information could
be stored in a data sequence until the cascading process finalized, and then the
failures of all rounds could be exported as a whole.
In general, the process of this attack simulation and visualization could be
described as below:
1. Build up the topology for a power grid;
2. Calculate the metrics value of each node to choose the most vulnerable node
to be the first victim node;
3. Recalculate the distribution of load and find out new victims at each round,
store the victim substation IDs;
4. Communicate the results from MATLAB to GIS database, and update the
visual information in the ArcGIS;
5. Repeat the process until no more failure nodes can be identified, i.e., the end
of the cascading failure process.
4.2.2 Interface Between MATLAB and ArcGIS
In ArcGIS, our GIS database is stored in a format called “shapefiles”, defined
by Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) as a popular geospatial data
format for GIS systems. A dataset usually consists of three shapefiles for each
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single layer: a .shp file containing primary geographic reference data, a .dbf file
storing all the attribute values, and a .shx file saving the shape index table. It may
also contain a projection file (.prj) or a spatial index file (.sbn), which are not used
in our current experiments [97]. The database format is ideal for visualization as
it can be imported into two sets of fields in MATLAB, one fixed set containing
the geometry information such as the coordinates and types of object (e.g., point,
link or polygon), and another set of attributes includes all other specific informa-
tion of the object. For entries like power plants and substations, the attribute
set stores information including information of location, load, owner, voltage cat-
egory, generator/fuel type, etc. For branches (transmission lines) the attribute set
could provide voltage category, length in mile or kilometers, IDs and names of
nodes connected, among others. These set attributes could be easily customized
and updated, which is ideal for real-time monitoring and management through a
visualization platform.
The shapefile database can be imported to MATLAB as structure arrays by
using MATLAB mapping toolbox. The mapping toolbox is a set of tools and
utilities to process geographic data analysis and map displaying. It was first intro-
duced in MATLAB 6.0 and is updated with every following release of MATLAB.
An interface in MATLAB is also developed to update the cascading information
into shapefiles, which can be described as four steps, the data pre-loading, the
initialization, the search and update of victims, and the export.
Pre-load Data
At the first step, MATLAB loads a sequence of a cascading failure generated
by the attack algorithm. The failure sequence is an M-by-N matrix of which all
element values are initialized to zero, where M is the number of rounds of cascading
and N is the number of final victim nodes. For each row in the matrix, the jth
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row in failure sequence contains the IDs of all victim nodes that have already been
knocked down at the jth round.
In addition, MATLAB also loads the shapefiles from both databases of substa-
tions and transmission lines, matching up the victim nodes information with the
failure sequence. The import is done by a function called shaperead from MAT-
LAB’s mapping toolbox, which reads geo-information stored in shapefile format
and arrange them into an array of geo-structures. The compact geo-structure array
is MATLAB-friendly and easy to customize, providing fast calculation as well as
good compatibility.
After this step, we store three arrays in MATLAB: an M-by-N failure sequence
called Fail seq, a K-by-1 structure array of nodes called NODE and an L-by-
1 structure array of branches called LINK, where K and L are the numbers of
substations and transmission lines in our database, respectively. In our case, K =
553 and L =726.
Initialization
At the second step, our interface customizes the database by introducing a new
field FAIL to each element of both structure arrays NODE and LINK, which would
be exported as one attribute for each database. In our current development, this
attribute will simply record the round number when the current object is taken
down by the failure cascading. A zero value of FAIL means the current object
(node or link) has not been affected by the cascading, while a positive value k
indicates that the current object is already taken down in the kth round. In this
way, our VBA script could effectively read the FAIL attribute and visualize its
value in ArcGIS.
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Search and Update Victim Nodes
In the shapefile dataset, the substations’ IDs are stored in an attribute named
SUBID, which would be imported as one field of the structure array in MATLAB.
Also, the IDs of the two nodes connected by a given transmission line are stored in
our transmission line database and would be imported as two fields named SUB1ID
and SUB2ID in the structure array of LINK. In this step, the interface first searches
the SUBID field of structure array NODE with each of the failed nodes’ IDs, and
updates the field of FAIL of the corresponding node with the round that it fails,
i.e. the number of the first row that contains the ID in the fail sequence. Then
our interface does the same thing for the transmission lines, compares the IDs of
Fail seq with the sequences of SUB1ID and SUB2ID to identify which branches
are connected to the given failed nodes, and updates the FAIL value for each
transmission line with the round number in which it fails.
In order to provide better performance, we also sort the database according
to the most important information. In this interface, both structure arrays NODE
and LINK are sorted on the FAIL value before written back to the database. To be
specific, entries of nodes or branches will be stored in an order such that the node
failed at the earliest round will stay on top of the array while the node failed in the
final round will stay at the bottom. In this way, the VBA script in ArcGIS can read
the FAIL value sequentially and highlight this key information more efficiently.
Export to Shapefiles
The export of geo-structure array in MATLAB is as convenient as the import
process. The mapping toolbox provides a function called shapewrite to export geo-
structure arrays to shapefiles. Since we only add one field in the structure array
which will be converted to an attribute in the database, we simply call shapewrite
with the name and directory of the two databases and the updated information
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is saved into shapefiles for the ArcGIS. One practical fact to note is that when
exporting geo-structure to a shapefile format using the shapewrite function, a
number writing error may appear in earlier version (before R2007b) of mapping
toolbox. A numeric value longer than 10 digits will cause a mismatch in shapefiles
while the bug was not informed in MATLAB. In R2007b, an error will occur,
warning that matrix dimensions do not match. The best solution is to update
MATLAB to the latest version in which the bug has been fixed.
While we are processing a GIS database which stores information of substa-
tions and transmission lines separately, we should keep aware that there could be
some data inconsistency across the shapefiles for each layer. The limited size of our
snapshot could lead to incomplete information on connectivity of power grid. In
some cases, the value of SUB1ID or SUB2ID in the structure array LINK for the
branches could be zero. The reason is that the corresponding branch may connect
a pure power plant to a substation, while we do not have an SUBID for this node
of power plant. And there are also other cases that a node itself is both a power
plant and substation, assigned to distinct IDs. As a result, in the upper Bay Area
power grid studied in this chapter, there are 41 out of 726 branches yielding some
form of data inconsistency, while 13 of the ID-mismatch nodes in the branch layer
are actually isolated from the main grid in the Bay Area, which possibly means
that they could be part of another power grid not fully covered in this regional
snapshot.
4.2.3 Visualization in ArcGIS
The credit of this subsection is given to Yida Yang, who worked with the
author together in the same project, with the corresponding script and text written
by him. To keep the integrity of this chapter, this subsection (Sect. 4.2.3) is
included as in the original published conference paper [96]. The objective of the
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visualization is to acquire the GIS database containing data for substation and
transmission line failure and then display the results in ArcGIS in an animated way,
so that the cascading failure effects are effectively displayed and the critical nodes
can be quickly identified. In addition, the interface should allow user interaction,
meaning that users can manually select attack victim on the platform and see the
cascading effect due to the failure of such nodes. Therefore, users can compare and
contrast the vulnerability of nodes visually and identify the nodes that are most
critical.
The objective is achieved by Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) program-
ming in ArcGIS Desktop, which is one of the application components of ArcGIS. It
consists of ArcObjects, a set of platform-independent software components written
in C++, which provides services to support GIS applications on the desktop in
the form of thick and thin clients and on the server. The results of the visualiza-
tion program are displayed in ArcMap, the main component of ArcGIS Desktop,
together with geographical basemap. The flowchart for visualization is shown in
Fig.5 and the corresponding script was developed by my co-worker Yida Yang as
a co-author in the published conference paper [96].
The VBA script has 4 major steps:
1. Retrieve selected attack victim node from user and pass the node information
to MATLAB;
2. Read shapefiles to obtain the node and link information after Matlab finishes
calculation and returns the result;
3. Draw all categories for both substation and transmission line data according
to the value in the FAIL attribute;
4. Apply color for better visualization.
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Figure 5. The detailed flowchart of the integrated visualization platform
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Step 2 and step 3 can be accomplished by using ArcObjects member functions
and methods. In step 2, a workspace has been opened to load the feature classes in
shapefile. The IMap.DeleteLayer and IMap.AddLayer functions are used to clean
previous data and add new data, respectively. Two sets of data have been added
into the workspace, one for substations, and the other for transmission lines.
In step 3, the iRender object iss used to add categories according to the
FAIL value. The iRender.Addvalue function was called twice to apply to both
substations and transmission lines. The categories added for both data sets match
the round in which they were knocked down.
Step 4 has been the most challenging part. In this part, the program dis-
plays the substations and transmission line failure in an order in which they have
been knocked down. Due to the possibility of a node (substation) fails after all
the transmission lines affiliating to it have already failed, a mismatch between the
FAIL value in substation and transmission line in the same loop cycle may occur.
The issue was resolved by comparing the FAIL value for substation and transmis-
sion line and making the “painting” function for transmission line wait for one or
multiple loop cycles until the FAIL value for both are equal. In addition, three
colors, red and blue and black are used to distinguish substations and transmis-
sion lines that are knocked down in the current round, knocked down in previous
rounds or in normal operation, respectively. The nodes, which are more critical
and may cause more devastating effect if failed, can be identified. Furthermore,
the time interval between failure rounds can be controlled by the “Wait” function.
4.3 Simulation Result
The visualization platform has been developed with MATLAB R2010b and
ArcGIS 10.0. The data are a snapshot extracted from the POWERmap GIS dataset
provided by PLATTS, including 726 transmission lines and 553 substations to
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represent the major power grid of upper Bay area in San Francisco, California, as
shown in Fig.. Each link and node contains attributes that could be imported into
MATLAB in forms of structure arrays.
Several experiments have been performed using this real database. Fig.7 to
Fig.8 show some map snapshots of the results. A node or a link in normal condition
is shown in black. All the new victims at the current round are highlighted in red,
while the previous victims have been marked as blue for clear visualization. In the
all these experiments, the network tolerance factor (see [92]) is set to be 1.2, an
empirical value also suggested in [55]. Fig.7 displays the moment when the first
victim node is under attack. When it fails, all the branches associated with it also
fails. Fig.8 shows the finalized cascading failure where all possible substations and
transmission lines fail according to the cascading failure simulator. These results
clearly demonstrate that by carefully selecting the attack victim nodes at the very
beginning, it is possible to break down the entire Bay area power grid.
In addition, we are also able to visualize the effects of sequential attacks of
the grid via using this platform. Here, the sequential attack means that more than
one attacks can be launched sequentially in different rounds. In the sequential
attack model tested in our experiment, it is assumed that the cascading effect
of the previous attack had already come to a stop due to some system protection
mechanisms, but the failure area has not been restored before the launch of another
attack. So the previous cascading will only black out part of the grid and the new
attack will continued to cause failure propagation in the remaining power grid.
The results of sequential attack are shown in Fig.9 to Fig.11b. In Fig.9 we
show the result of first attack (launched at the identical victim as in Fig.7) right
before the cascading failure is stopped thanks to some type of rescue effort. Then
Fig.10a shows the beginning of another attack, which starts afterwards and affects
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Figure 6. The upper Bay Area grid under normal operation
Figure 7. The first victim failed at the first round
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Figure 8. Final stabilized cascading failure
a distinct region from the first attack chosen by the attacker. At this moment, as
we can see, the result of the first attack still remains unrestored. Then Fig.10b
shows the cascading effect at the end of the second attack when it comes to a
natural stop. Finally in Fig.11a, the third and last attack starts in a region closer
to the second one, while Fig.11b shows the final cascading result of all three attacks.
Note that the failure propagation of the first attack has separated the grid into
several disconnected regions or “islands” when it was stopped by rescue effort.
Therefore, the cascading effect of the following attacks, which takes place in the
separated islands, will not propagate to the other islands of the grid. This example
illustrates not only how failure can propagate in different sub-grids, but also that
the remaining grid can be the potential target of a series of attacks.
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Figure 9. Cascading effect of the first attack
4.4 Discussion
From our simulation results, some interesting initial observations have been
made. As shown in Fig.12a and Fig.12b, there are some critical moments during
the cascading procedure, in which failure of certain nodes can cause a long distance
migration of subsequent cascading failure into a remote part of the power grid in
a very short time. These nodes should also be considered as critical as the victims
that yield a large size of final cascading failure, for the reason that they play
important roles in the prevention of a small area failure turning into a cross-region
disaster. At the beginning stage, the new failures only emerge in neighbors of most
recently failed nodes, and the spatial distance between them is relatively small.
This shows a typical behavior of a transmission cluster, in which interdependent
nodes are closely connected by branches. However, after several rounds, the edge
nodes of cascading become more spatially scattered: new victim nodes could be
widely separated in distance, and the cascading may happen in remote regions that
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(a)
(b)
Figure 10. Sequential attack: (a) launching the 2nd (b) end of the 2nd
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(a)
(b)
Figure 11. Sequential attack: (a) launching the 3rd (b) end of the 3rd
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are not around the edge of most recent cascading failure areas. We refer to the
critical moment as the round when new victim nodes become disconnected in a
remote region in comparison to the existing victim nodes, a phenomenon that poses
more challenges to the protection of power grids and requires more inter-regional
cooperation among different power companies and operators. Our experiments
show the existence of such critical moments of failure migration, which are also
observed and described in [55] in a power grid structured in a theoretical rather
than practical way, whose observation was that “the consecutive cascading failure
can occur at an arbitrary long distance”.
In addition, our simulation results also reveal that the connectivity of compo-
nents does not necessarily determine the severity of subsequent cascading failure
when they are the initial victims, even though connectivity itself, as in the defi-
nition of load, is highly associated with the load. For example, in Fig.6 to 8, the
attack on an edge node connecting only a leaf node to the main grid, can also
result in a severe cascading failure; however, another example shown in Fig.13a
and 13b reveals that a node with almost the same connectivity in the grid, i.e.
a transitional node connecting a leaf node to the main grid, will only result in a
much smaller impact in the power system.
More interestingly, in simulation we can find some hub nodes that yield a large
connectivity and server as a regional connecting point; and while most attacks on
them can lead to significant impact on the security of the benchmark system (Table
1), in some specific cases, the failure of a hub node (a node serves as a regional
connecting point) may merely lead to no or little cascading impact as shown in
Fig.14.
These observations have been summarized in Table 1, which shows the degree
(the number of immediate neighbors), the number of nodes with the corresponding
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(a)
(b)
Figure 12. An example of cascading migration (a) before critical moment (b) after
critical moment
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Table 1. Summary of connectivity and PoF distribution
Node Number of Number of Node Number of Number of
Degree Nodes PoF > 10% Degree Nodes PoF > 10%
1 163 7 10 1 1
2 127 24 12 1 1
3 150 44 14 1 1
4 31 10 15 3 2
5 9 3 16 3 3
6 9 4 22 1 1
7 4 1 27 1 1
8 3 1 32 1 1
9 2 1
the degree, and among these nodes how many single-victim attacks can lead reach
a PoF above 10% in the upper Bay area. As we can see, although for nodes with a
larger degree, the discrepancy between the corresponding number of nodes and the
number of more vulnerable victims narrows down, it is still observed that for nodes
with any connectivity, even with very small values, they can still trigger large area
cascading failures as well. In other words, the degree of a node itself is not a good
indicator to predict the final impact of an initial attack. The reason behind can
be interpreted by the influence of the neighboring nodes. As an example, the edge
victim node in Fig.6 has a neighbor with higher connectivity to the main regional
transmission network than the other victim node in Fig.13a. This difference in
neighborhood nodes results in the different load and thus distinct cascading im-
pact once they’ve been attacked and their load redistributed. Therefore, due to the
network resilience and redistribution policy, the spatial vulnerability of power sys-
tem could be more complex than a simple topological issue which requests further
in-depth investigation.
In summary, these observations above have shown that some crucial infor-
mation could be obtained from the visualization of the cascading failure in the
geo-space. Also, since most simulation of the attack and the entire cascading pro-
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(a)
(b)
Figure 13. A victim near the edge (a) being attacked and (b) its cascading impact
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Figure 14. A hub victim that yields no cascading effect
cess cost less than 2 seconds using the GIS maps, it is very efficient to simulate
Smart Grid attacks and locate the most vulnerable nodes of a given transmission
network in this intuitive and illustrative way. With this information at hand, it
becomes more convenient for designers to refine topology of the electric grid un-
der operation constraints, increase fault tolerance, and redistribute the power flow
properly, which would help improve the security and reliability of the smart grid.
In addition, some of the important simulation results (e.g. most fatal attack and
their corresponding victims) could be stored as an intelligence database, so that if
a cascade failure is inevitable in real world scenario, power engineers can quickly
identify the source of failure or blackout, find out the most emergent nodes to
protect or restore at the current round, such that it will be possible to efficiently
recover the Smart Grid from black-outs and significantly reduce the time that
consumers have to suffer from power outages.
Other preliminary results, following similar direction from both the author
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of the thesis [98] as well as from other researchers [29, 55] have also shown other
approaches that we can explore the structural vulnerability of the power system
via geospatial information or geographic correlation. However, this will not be
covered in the proposed scope of the thesis, and interested readers can refer to
these reference papers for more information.
49
CHAPTER 5
Revealing Temporal Features in the Cascading Failure Process
In addition to the spatial information of cascading failure discussed in previous
chapter, in this chapter, as part of a published work [99], the author will discuss
the exploration of temporal features of cascading process.
5.1 Temporal Features in Power Grid Cascading Failure
Compared to traditional power system security analysis, there is another less-
developed topic on cascading failure, i.e. the assessment of temporal features or
patterns for the intermediate events and stages of cascading failure, which can
become a new perspective to the cascading analysis. In reality, a cascading fail-
ure rarely propagates across the whole power transmission network and blacks
out large scale areas without being detected, mitigated or stopped by automatic-
protective mechanism and rescue efforts. In order to reduce the risk and impact
of major blackouts, the knowledge of temporal features and patterns is critical for
responding to cascading failures with timely and sufficient defense strength at an
early stage. To be specific, there are three major reasons to further investigate the
cascading failure from the time domain:
1. While various selections of victims can lead to similar scale of cascading
failures in a power grid, the procedure of each varies from one another by
features like the scale, rate, duration of failure propagation at certain critical
moments and stages;
2. The resources available to defend cascading failure are usually limited and
require different amount of time to be activated, so timing is critical to
properly deploy the defense power to optimize the effect of rescuing efforts;
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3. Though well-design power systems with larger fault tolerance can be more
resilient to cascading failures and Smart Grid attacks, the required cost of
hardware and maintenance can be intimidating. Thus comprehensive studies
on temporal features, which add a “temporal” factor to the power system
resilience, can maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of defense with rel-
atively lower requirements of system tolerance. This is critical for smaller,
distributed infrastructures and facilities that are widely integrated in the
Smart Grid.
In this chapter, another factor in cascading failure, i.e. the overcurrent relays in
power systems, will be incorporated into the study. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
power system relays play a critical role in many cascading events. The relays,
which can automatically cut off risky components to maintain the stability of the
current power network, can also adversely trigger a large scale outage due to the
insufficient generation units connected to the grid to meet the demand when the
relays disconnect them.
From the security perspective, relays hacked or controlled by malignant at-
tackers can pose a great threat to the power system stability. Using this hijacked
relays, attackers can trip branches, isolates substations and islands grids, among
others. Therefore, it is important to consider and simulate the role and influence
of these relays in cascading failure events. Based on the simple model described
in Chapter 4 and employed in Chapter 5, some modifications have been made to
better approximate the system behavior with the presence of power system relays.
5.1.1 Model Specification for the Temporal Analysis
The simulation model for the temporal analysis in this chapter is based on the
one that was used previously. However, it has an important modification to rep-
resent a critical temporal factor that will affect the failure propagation, i.e. power
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system relays that cut overloaded components after the accumulated overload ex-
ceeds a certain amount. This means instead of instantly tripping (or removing) the
heavily overloaded node or branch, to better approximate the temporal process of
failure propagation, in this modified model the overloaded components will main-
tain less efficient but yet effective operation for a certain amount of time until the
thermal overload has been accumulated over a given threshold. From the defensive
view, this period represents a transitional window embedded in the power system
that allows proper reactions before the overloading situation worsens.
Therefore, we apply a time-delay overcurrent relay in our model which mon-
itors and modifies the status of overloading nodes. To be specific, a timer will
be triggered whenever a node starts to overload, and its output is taken into an
accumulative function of both overloading ratio and time. In each round, we test
the overloading status of nodes, increase the value of the timer and update cas-
cading node failures accordingly. It may take several rounds for a node turns from
overloading to failure, and once it fails the corresponding load redistribution and
topology updating will be performed for the iterative simulation in the next round.
With the assumptions above, the accumulative time-delay function is defined
as
d(n) =
n∑
k=0
Lk − TL0 (4)
where n is the number of rounds that a node has been through in overloading
status, T is the tolerance of a given system, and Lk is the current load of a given
node at round k. The timer is triggered when Lk is larger than its capacity TL0 and
accumulates over the duration of overloading. Similar to the continuous realtime
relay in [12], an empirical threshold of d(n) is set so that any node carrying an
extra load of 50% of its capacity for D rounds will be regarded as failed, and
the relay will instantly disconnect the failed nodes from the power grid. In other
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words, D is the maximal time-delay before the relay considers the overloading of
a given node is fatal enough to be cut off from the power grid.
According to Equation (4), the overloading timer of a node launches when its
load goes above its capacity, otherwise it will be reset to zero. In other words, the
relay will not affect the status of a node that has already failed, not yet reached
a fatally overloaded ratio, or already recovered from the dangerous state. From
Equation (4) it is shown that for nodes which yield lower overloading ratio or less
overloading rounds, they will remain in operation longer. Also, since in reality some
policies will be automatically applied to the overloaded component to mitigate
its overloading, we consider a maximal duration of overloading, beyond with the
overloading will not be fatal anymore. Specifically, in the following simulation it is
assumed that a cascading failure ends when no subsequent failure emerges in 3D
rounds.
In general, the overall procedure of cascading failure is illustrated in Fig.15.
This simulation model builds up the platform for our temporal feature analysis.
5.1.2 Temporal Features of Cascading Failure
To reveal the temporal features of cascading failure initiated by attacks, the
percentage of failed nodes (PoF ) at a given round will be measured, whose defini-
tion is the same as in previous chapters. Intuitively, the value of PoF will increase
nonlinearly over time, and at some moments its raise will suddenly boost within a
short period, which means the cascading failure is accelerating during this period.
For each cascading failure initiated from different victims, there are three aspects
to look into this temporal feature:
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Figure 15. The flowchart of cascading failure model with time-delay
Leaps
A “leap” is the sudden dramatic rises of PoF within a small number of rounds,
whose duration and magnitude differentiate various process of cascading failure
from each other and provides key information on the optimal timing for response
action. With similar final PoF , the duration of a cascading failure can tell how
quickly the leap can shock the power grid and the magnitude can illustrate how
strong the impact is. Specifically, a leap of the failure percentage occurs between
round n and n + ∆n if the following criterion is satisfied for all rounds between n
and n + ∆n
PoF (n + ∆n)− PoF (n) ≥ P1 (5)
where P1 = 0.015, so we will consider an increase of PoF as a leap if its magnitude
is no less than 1.5% for at least one round, and its duration is an upper bound
N such that any ∆n ≤ N satisfies the condition in Equation (5). Note that P1
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is related to the strength of the initial attack, and for some large power grids P1
should be decreased accordingly as even the same powerful attacks in those grids
are not likely to result in the same actual number of failure, or the magnitude of
leaps.
First response moment
In the early stage of failure propagation, the period before the first leap occurs
or the overall failure percentage reaches a certain degree is often the “golden time”
to take actions to minimize the impact of cascading failure. Hence a first response
moment n0 is defined as
n0 = min{n1, n2} (6)
where
n1 = argmin
n
{PoF (n + 1)− PoF (n) ≥ P1} (7)
n2 = argmin
n
{PoF (n) ≥ P2} (8)
In the equations above, we use P1 = 0.015 as in Equation (5), and choose P2 = 0.1
to mark the threshold for a failure that exhibits significant damage to the power
grid. Therefore Equation (6) identifies the very first round in which either the first
leap appears or the failure percentage PoF first reaches 10%.
Number of leaps and buffer period
In each cascading procedure, there could be multiple leaps, and the number
of leaps in a single cascading procedure reflects how radical the increase of PoF is.
Given a fixed final failure percentage PoF , a number of leaps indicates that the
cascading failure will go through several stages, between which the rate propagation
will slow down for certain amount of time, then it will accelerate again when some
other critical component failures occur due to their fatal overloading. Hence, the
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intervals between leaps of a PoF curve, if exist, can provide useful information on
the buffer periods during which actions can be taken to effectively mitigate the
cascading failure before next dramatic rise of failure percentage.
The knowledge of this feature reveals more importance when the defense
strength of power grids are limited to cope with small scale cascading failures.
In many cases, there could be a few small leaps and buffer periods, and each of
them represents a temporal window that allows power grid managers to reallocate
power demands, activate backup resources, and restore normal power delivery;
whereas in other cases cascading failure with consecutive big leaps merely allows
limited time to response immediately at an early stage.
For all the temporal features discussed above, one fact to notice in our model
is that the system parameters such as maximal time-delay D, system tolerance T
and even the spatial connection can substantially affect the cascading procedure in
different power grids. Therefore in the simulation we will also evaluate how these
factors can impact the cascading failure.
5.2 Simulation Setup
In the following simulations, we will reveal temporal features of cascading
failure by testing various maximal delays D, victims v0 and system tolerances
T . The test power grid in our simulation is the Bay Area grid extracted from
the POWERmap GIS dataset provided by PLATTS. This snapshot is the latest
update in July 2012 with 510 nodes in the lower Bay area, which is slightly different
from the one used in previous chapter. It represents a typical regional power grid
of a metropolitan area which will easily draw the attention of potential malignant
attackers, and its topology and geometry is shown in Fig.16. Note that a leap in
this power grid by previous definition involves the failure of more than 12 nodes
within one round, which can be a serious enough failure in the power system.
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Figure 16. The upper Bay Area power grid with 510 nodes
We consider the power grid has a possible system tolerance T ranging from 1.0
to 2.0. Assume that attackers can only obtain limited information of the power grid
such as the topology and the top loaded nodes, but they have no further knowledge
of the status of power grid generation, operation or management. Intuitively they
are likely to choose the nodes with the greatest load if there is no other cost of
attack considered. Therefore we perform the simulation on the nodes with the
greatest initial load to explore the temporal features in cascading failure and how
they are affected by different system parameters.
5.3 Temporal Feature Revealed
First, by setting system tolerance T = 1.1, we select the top 9 nodes with the
largest load as the candidate of victim for a single victim attack, and then simulate
the cascading process for various values of D under a given tolerance. The general
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Table 2. General information on the most loaded nodes in temporal analysis
Rank Node ID Load PoFf
1 15 2496 92.94%
2 14 2112 92.94%
3 38 1380 92.75%
4 53 1131 92.94%
5 29 825 92.75%
6 77 781 92.75%
7 76 741 92.94%
8 57 702 92.94%
9 55 689 92.94%
information of victim load and blackout size is shown in Table 2, where PoFf is
the final failure percentage after each attack under the condition that T = 1.1
and D = 0. Each cascading failure starts from distinct attacked victim that has
the greatest load in Bay Area. As we can see from Table 2, the final percentage
of failure PoFf is similar to each other in most cases under the given low system
tolerance T = 1.1, providing little information to compare between these attack
schemes. Although this appears to indicate that all these attacks are impactful,
yet by exploring the temporal features, some significant differences can be detected
and it proves to be a practical way to compare the vulnerability of different nodes
in terms of cascading failure, as the following simulations and discussions exhibit.
In Fig.17, the PoF curves obtained from our simulation results with respect
to the number of rounds under various values of D are illustrated, where the X-axis
is the round of cascading failure and the Y-axis is the failure percentage PoF . For
some values of D, there will be no cascading failure observed within 3D rounds
after the initial attacks on some of the victims, and thus the corresponding PoF
curves are not shown in Fig.17 for better visual clearance.
First, we suppose that all devices have the same value of D. From Fig.17 it is
clear that the time for each attack to reach its final impact varies from each other
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Figure 17. The cascading failure caused by attacks for T = 1.1.
in terms of rounds, and the difference becomes more distinct with the increase
of D. For some victim nodes, e.g. Node 38, 55 and 57, their cascading process
exhibit stages of acceleration and slowdown in the rise of PoF until the failures
finally reach the stable state. Also, under different values of D, e.g. D = 1 and
D = 0, attacks on Node 29 and 53 allow first response moment to be sufficiently
long since no additional failure occurs in 3D rounds; while for Node 77 as the
victim, the first response moment n0 will be doubled by increasing D to 1. Similar
increase of n0 can be found in attacks on victim nodes like Node 14, 15, 55 and 57
as well, with different values of D in the comparison. Moreover, for Node 55 and
57, with any non-zero values of D, the cascading process in each case displays two
major leaps with a buffer period in-between, and the increase of D can introduce
an extending buffer period between the leaps for each attack scenario.
However, for Node 14, 15, the presence of a relay will not be able break the
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single leap into several like they do for Node 55 and 57, nor will they bring up
any buffer periods; only a minor fluctuation of the growth of PoF is found in
each attack. Nevertheless, the first response moment n0 is indeed extended due to
the extra time required to accumulate the thermal overload until a fatal level is
reached. Meanwhile, it is noticed that for Node 38, the cascading process yields a
slowdown at a late stage, even though it is not identified as a buffer period or a
breakdown of a single leap in our criteria.
As the the simulation results suggest that D can significantly change the shape
of PoF in the time-domain, it suggests the importance of their application in the
power grids. Therefore, more general discussions on the relays as an individual
factor affecting the temporal features will be included in Sect. 5.4.1
Also, take the cascading failure of attacking Node 57 as an example, given
that we have the prior knowledge that D = 3. From Fig.18, we can identify
three leaps during the cascading failure: a minor leap take place from Round 8
to Round 15, and a major leap from Round 26 to Round 35, respectively. Hence
the first response time n0 in this specific case is 8, while there is one buffer period
from Round 16 to Round 25. These temporal features clearly highlight the critical
moments to response to the cascading failure caused by attacking Node 55:
To avoid a cascading failure in the gird, actions must be made within 8 rounds
to mitigate the 13 overloaded nodes caused by the failure Node 55, either by calling
up backup resources or cutting off demands. If this critical period is missed, the
failure propagation accelerates and it would be difficult to limit the cascading effect
until Round 13, after which the cascading speed slows down to less than 1.5% each
round for 13 rounds. And this will be the last chance to curb the cascading failure
at a failure percentage of about 22%. It is observed that during this period,
although there are 4 rounds with only one or no node failure, there are already
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Figure 18. The change of failure percentage at each round for Node 57.
over 15% nodes failed with 8 to 34 nodes overloaded, so it requires much more
effort to stop the cascading failure compared to the first response period. After
Round 25, the cascading process will inevitably accelerates again until it reaches
a finally stabilized yet disastrous state.
5.4 Discussions
With the simulations discussed above, it then becomes feasible to discuss the
factors that can affect the temporal features, which can provide decision supports
to enhance the power grid security accordingly.
5.4.1 Time-Delay Relay
As shown in Fig.17, the maximal time-delay D plays an important role in the
cascading procedure. Most nodes only have one major leap because of the heavy
load they are carrying, especially when D is low and allows little time before an
overloading turns into a failure. In Fig.17, the cascading procedure for all these 9
nodes are quite similar when D = 0, and so it will be very challenging to intervene
the cascading process at an early stage, in which the initial impact of the attack
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has not shown up.
However, when the value of D is increased, some of nodes like Node 14, 38, 76,
57 and 55 will yield some leaps during the cascading, and buffer periods will emerge
when D is increased large enough. In reality, if D is raised sufficiently large, the
power system will have plenty of time to restore normal operation automatically
or manually, hence eliminating the chance of cascading failure. For example for
Node 53 and 29, by increasing D to any integers larger than 1, no cascading failure
will occur in the Bay Area, even if they have the 4th and 5th largest load in the
power grid with 510 nodes. Unfortunately, the installation of such highly resilient
relays and branches can be not only expensive, but also risky since the tripping or
cutoff also plays crucial roles in keeping the system stable when other faults are
taking place.
Meanwhile, the time in which a leap is delayed by increased D is not a linear
function of D, as shown in the figures. Comparing the PoF curves, it is shown
that an increased value of D determines the total rounds of cascading failure before
it stabilizes, the first response moment n0 corresponding to the a major leap or a
significant failure scale.
Based on the influence of D to the cascading process in the time-domain shown
in Fig.17, we can categorize the victims and cascading failures into three general
types:
1. Preventable: Victim nodes like Node 53, 29, 77 can fall into this category,
all of which can be effectively defended by proper increase of D rather than
post-attack responses, since for the potential cascading that may occur there
is little variation in the development of a series of rapidly propagating failure;
2. Vulnerable/critical: Victims like Node 15, 14 can be the representative of
the second category. Node failure included in this category yield significant
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resistance to the increase of D, marking them more vulnerable and critical
in the power system infrastructure;
3. Defensible: Victim nodes in the last category include Node 57 and 55, on
which we have found significant influence of D to the first response moment,
the buffer periods as well as the leaps. In other words, temporal analysis on
these victim nodes can reveal more helpful information to the Smart Grid
operators, facilitate proper and timely reaction to the attacks detected.
5.4.2 Spatial Connectivity
In addition to the time-delayed relays, from the PoF curves in Fig.17, we can
see that the spatial location and connection can affect temporal features as well.
First, when two nodes are spatially close to each other, their PoF curves exhibit
similar patterns given the same system parameters, as shown in the cases of Node
15 and 14, and Node 55 and 57, suggesting that they are interdependent in the
cascading failures. Second, while the buffer periods can start at arbitrary rounds
with different lengths if the value of D is changed, they always correspond to a
certain value or range of failure percentage PoF , which is associated with a given
spatial area affected by the cascading failure. This observation implies that the
buffer period is also related to the actual geo-spatial cluster of failed nodes.
5.4.3 System Tolerance
Finally, choosing the single victim attack on node 57 as an example, the effect
of system tolerance T on the intermediate stages of cascading failure is shown in
Fig.19, with D = 1. Increasing T from 1.0 to 1.3 can break down a large leap
into smaller ones, thus generating a buffer period and increasing the length of it.
Also, when T reaches a threshold, it can essentially prevent the cascading failure;
for instance, it is observed that when T is equal or larger than 1.3, there will be
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Figure 19. The influence of system tolerance
not cascading effect at all if the attacker chooses to initiate the cascading failure
from Node 57. However, in reality the cost to construct and maintain such a high
tolerance can be prohibitive, which means the temporal feature is still important
in providing critical information for the timing of defense response.
5.5 Summary
In summary, in this chapter we reveal several critical temporal features in the
cascading analysis of power system. While for the most loaded nodes in the power
grid the cascading procedure after they have been attacked could lead to similar
final failure percentage, the intermediate process varies significantly. Therefore,
temporal features provide key information on the defense against Smart Grid at-
tacks. These features includes the time-domain location, magnitude, duration,
number of occurrence of leaps as well as the buffer period for a second chance to
response. Among them we have explored three of the most critical and meaningful,
i.e. the leaps, the buffer period and the first response moment, and the number of
leaps. The study in this chapter can shed some light on an important dimension
for cascading failure analysis in the development of a comprehensive understand-
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ing of Smart Grid security, which can help in the operation, protection as well as
planning of the Smart Grid.
65
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The Smart Grid, while enjoying the latest intelligent technologies for efficient
and reliable power delivery, is also facing some critical security issues raised by
both the original structural vulnerability of traditional power systems as well as its
integration with communication networks. This thesis has focused on the security
analysis of Smart Grid on a specific type of threat, i.e the cascading failures caused
by potential attackers in power grids. Simulations and discussions in this work are
drawn from two perspectives, i.e. spatial patterns and temporal features, where
the corresponding results are obtained on a carefully refined topological model.
In the analysis of spatial pattern, an integrated ArcGIS-MATLAB based vi-
sualization platform developed by the author and his teammate is first presented.
The compact demo is then employed to study cascading failures of a smart grid
under attack scenarios in the geographic space. Our detailed implementation strat-
egy and simulation results demonstrate the complex spatial patterns observed in
the simulation of power grid cascading events, the existence of critical moment of
long distance failure propagation within a short time, and the relationship between
the size of cascading failure with respect to the connectivity of each substation.
Hopefully the specialized platform can allow power engineers and operators to
effectively and efficiently model and simulate different attack strategies, facilitate
understanding of power grid behaviors under complex cascading failures, and even-
tually help the development of advanced defense strategies to enhance the security
and reliability of the Smart Grid.
In the analysis of temporal features, several critical temporal features have
been revealed in the cascading analysis of power system. Although for the most
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loaded nodes in the power grid the cascading procedure leads to similar final size of
cascading failure, the intermediate stages vary significantly. Therefore, temporal
features such as the location and magnitude of sudden change of failure/blackout
size, the corresponding duration, the number of occurrence of such “leaps” as
well as the “buffer periods” which allow a second chance to response, provide
key information on the defense against smart grids attacks. Specific examples
have been discussed in the related chapters with their practical meaning to the
timely response of such attacks. This study on the temporal features of cascading
procedure caused by malicious attacks can provide another important dimension
to the comprehensive understanding of smart grid security and help power system
managers in the operation, protection and planning of Smart Grid.
6.2 Future Work
In general, our future work includes the following parts, which will consist of
the author’s work in his pursuit of PhD degree in the future:
• Improve the power grid model to an extended topology model [100] and
power flow model as presented in [12];
• Reveal more information on the intelligent attack strategies in the selection
of most vulnerable components in the power grid;
• Simulate defense strategies with limited strength and resources, and reveal
the optimal timing and tactic to respond to different types and stages of
smart grid attacks.
For the integrated visualization Smart Grid security platform, we are also
working to extend it to a larger scale database such as the entire North America
power grid, which contains thousands of substations as potential victim nodes
and tens of thousands of transmission lines, making it a much more complicated
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network. Since our structure of platform has not contained any limitation on the
size of dataset, it should have good scalability on cascading on the visualization
part. However, the computational cost may grow by a certain extent, which could
pose some challenges for the computation core and its real-time performance. Our
future work also aims at a highly integrated interface that is more versatile and
compatible with other power system models, and the whole simulation can be
embedded solely in ArcGIS, so it could provide more interactive control as well as
real-time visualization of power grid response to complicated attacks. In general,
all these works are expected to be helpful in defending the Smart Grid against the
potential smart attacks.
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